ABSTRACT

This chapter builds upon some of the insights about the directedness of attention to suggest ways of understanding the directedness of practice more generally. It outlines Schatzki’s conception of social practice, laying special emphasis upon his notions of the “teleoaffective structure” of practices and the associated “activity-place-spaces”. Schatzki does not defend a position according to which it is individuals, their “minds and actions”, nor social orders that lie at the root of social reality but social practice; indeed social orders and individuals are the results of practices. Within a given integrative practice, the components of the teleoaffective structure may be organized in a straightforwardly hierarchical way, and Schatzki usually discusses the relation between ends, projects, tasks, and doings and sayings as if these comprise a nested hierarchy. The chapter discusses Schatzki’s residual humanism and thus set up the more extended account of directionally asymmetrical subjectivity.