ABSTRACT
Is a general concept of law needed to embrace the range of regulatory regimes existing or emerging in a world in which transnational and intranational regulation are increasingly significant – a world which many writers have characterised as one of global legal pluralism? Does global legal pluralism require a concept of law? What purposes might such a concept serve? If (as is argued in this chapter) such a concept can have value, what approach should be taken in trying to formulate it? The chapter considers, first, how far it may be useful to conceptualise law in general terms at all. It goes on to consider problems that the diversity of transnational regulatory forms poses for any such project. Taking the social rule approach of H. L. A. Hart’s concept of law as a starting point, the chapter examines some crucial limitations of this orientation – in particular, limitations brought to light by reinterpreting politically and sociologically Hart’s analogy between legal rules and the rules of sports and games. Finally, in the light of these consideration, it suggests key elements (political, communal, institutional) to take into account in conceptualising law in a way that recognises appropriately the full range of contemporary national and transnational regulation.
