ABSTRACT
This chapter explains the various forms of prior restraint. It explains why the Supreme Court generally disfavors licensing but allows licensing in special contexts such as broadcasting. The chapter discusses the Court's tests for determining the constitutionality of content-neutral regulations. Where a government engages in postpublication punishments instead of prior restraints, the government may lack the resources to prosecute every publisher it would have censored if given the opportunity. Courts willingly issue injunctions to halt obscenity, false advertising, and fraud, speech that is outside constitutional protection. Another and broader prior restraint is imposed by the military on press coverage of combat operations. After licensing ended in England, the government controlled the press by taxing publications and advertisements. One of the most significant distinctions in the Supreme Court's contemporary First Amendment doctrine is between content-based and content-neutral regulations. One of the most important cases in the development of the Court's content-neutral methodology is United States v. O'Brien.
