ABSTRACT
Israel’s inability to quell the Palestinian uprising by military force in conjunction with the Middle Eastern geostrategic changes of the early 1990s considerably lowered Israel’s threat perception. This, in turn, opened the way to a more sophisticated approach to counter Islamic radicalism in the West Bank and Gaza combining force with programs aimed at fostering economic development and improved standards of living.
This chapter demonstrates that Israel proved moderately effective in fighting against Hamas: the Islamic Resistance Movement was contained militarily but Israeli efforts against Hamas’ civil array proved much less effective. At the tactical level, Israel managed to adapt by deviating from the well-rooted preference for offensive measures, and gradually acknowledging the relevance of defensive measures in coping with terrorist tactics. At the operational level, both the IDF and the political establishment found it hard to adapt to a constrained use of force, and to embrace the non-military dimensions of counterterrorism. Last but not least, uncertain whether Hamas was attempting to derail the negotiations or whether, conversely, it was trying to accelerate their course to pursue a phased military strategy, Israel found increasingly hard to adapt to the strategic conditions of combat.
