ABSTRACT
The al-Aqsa intifada was characterized by an elevated threshold of violence, combining mass demonstrations, terrorist attacks and urban guerrilla warfare carried out by all the Palestinian organizations. Consequently, despite its spearheading role in the insurgency, until 2002 the fight against Hamas was conducted within the framework of a strategy centered on the Palestinian Authority. Only from the beginning of 2003 did Israel develop a specifically-designed approach to counter Hamas.
The chapter shows that during the al-Aqsa intifada, Israel effectively fought against Hamas. At the tactical level, by capitalizing on improved intelligence, command and control and precision strike capabilities, the IDF was able to disrupt Hamas’ local networks and gradually impair their capabilities. At the operational level, Israel succeeded, to a certain extent, to drive a wedge between Hamas and its constituencies through collective punishments, intimidation by disproportionate force and extensive destruction of infrastructures. At the strategic level, Israel did not adapt. The Israeli strategic community clung to the view that cumulative military attrition provided the best solution for Israel in terms of bridging ends, ways and means and, most of all, that it was the only viable choice for convincing the Palestinians that they had no feasible military option.
