ABSTRACT
Since 2006, a portion of North Korea's clients appear similarly to regard their relationships with Pyongyang as transactional and transient. Admittedly, as taboos and regulations against North Korean arms trade have strengthened over time, the number of ad hoc customers has shrunk. From open sources, it seems that in the sanctions period only the Republic of the Congo (RoC), Tanzania and Eritrea can be placed in this category. In the RoC and Tanzania, and perhaps Eritrea as well, it is probable that relevant decision-makers may have been genuinely unaware that their deals constituted sanctions violations. Open-source information, which documents only a single contract with North Korea, tends to place Eritrea in the 'ad hoc' rather than 'resilient' or 'reluctant' camps. This chapter explains that it is the 'ad hoc' group that demonstrates the least affinity for North Korea as a supplier, and is more receptive to normative arguments to curtail any such relations.
