ABSTRACT
That long accepted definition is widely assumed to have blown apart by Gettier 1963. For his part Gettier does give the impression that he has shown that the accepted definition is inadequate, that justified true belief ‘does not state a sufficient condition for someone’s knowing a given proposition’ (p. 123). \fet Gettier makes no connection whatsoever between the question entitling his article, “Is justified true belief knowledge?”, and the contents of his article.226 The body of the article comprises two examples, directed against one unattributed explication of “s knows that P ”, and alleged to similarly counter two other attributed explications. There is accordingly prima facie ground for suspicion that the accepted definition has been taken apart only under defective explication. The present exercise aims to confirm that suspicion. All that Gettier has upset, disestablished, are certain decoupled explications, not the widely accepted definition.
