ABSTRACT
The interpretations of the distinction is called Language-as-Calculus respectively Language as the Universal Medium. The whole realistic (metaphysical) idea of 'reality' imposing its structure on 'language' from the 'outside' is gone. The adoption of the language-as-calculus view also provides the beginning of the development of the doctrine called 'logical semantics' which has been regarded as being on the borderline between 'philosophy' and 'classical' formal logic. By 'ordinary language' Carnap does not mean the same as Wittgenstein did by the very same expression. The characteristic feature, according to the interpretation by the Hintikkas, is that Wittgenstein is to have accepted this kind of 'holistic' dictum during his entire career in philosophy. If the 'logic' in Wittgenstein's pre-1929 thought is understood as being transcendental in the Kantian sense then the claim that we cannot think anything illogical turns out to be a natural consequence of the whole approach rather than a piece of scholastic subtlety.
