ABSTRACT
On May 7, 1913, Russell started working on his Theory of Knowledge manuscript. This chapter examines what was the criticism that left Russell so vexed. On 14th of May, Russell told Wittgenstein that he was working on a major book project which he hoped would supply firm foundations for his earlier work in logic. On 20th of May, Wittgenstein presented what Russell described to Ottoline as a 'refutation of the theory of judgement which I used to hold'. On the reading of the history, on the 26th of May, Wittgenstein adds a category constraint to his previous, more general, significance constraint; leaving Russell distraught. Russell conceives of the logical form of an n-adic complex as the completely general fact that there exist some n objects that are somewhere and somehow n-adically related. The chapter concludes with a brief exploration of why generations of thinkers since Russell have thought the multiple relation theory of judgment (MRTJ) to be unworthy of resurrecting.
