ABSTRACT
This chapter surveys philosophies which have been thought to advocate the elimination of metaphysics. A critique of metaphysics should not be confused with an anti-metaphysical philosophy, where the latter is understood to involve the advocacy of the elimination of metaphysics. The chapter argues that metaphysical necessity constitutes an intelligible notion of objective necessity distinct from logical necessity. It defends non-objectual modal realism against empiricist critics who have inherited the Humean mantle. The chapter examines the nature of the modality involved in verificationism. Hume is commonly regarded as a philosopher who espoused anti-metaphysical views, especially given the Humean lineage of the classic anti-metaphysical philosophy of the twentieth century, logical positivism. Despite Carnap's frequent emphasis on logical/syntactical considerations in his anti-metaphysical project, he also incorporated the epistemological/semantic aspect which Ayer placed in the foreground, namely verificationism.
