James M. Griffin and William S. Neilson (1994), ‘The 1985-86 Oil Price Collapse and Afterwards: What does Game Theory Add?’, Economic Inquiry, XXXII, pp. 543-61

One exception to the ad hoc explana­ tions is a game-theoretic interpretation offered by Alt, Calvert and H um es [1988]. They construct a finitely repeated game in which Saudi Arabia's punishm ent costs vary randomly from period to period, with the Saudis knowing their current punishment costs but not future punish­ ment costs. To them, the price collapse of 1985-86 should be interpreted as a random (and therefore unpredictable) effort by Saudi Arabia to reinforce its reputation as a low-cost producer and in the process discipline high-cost non-OPEC producers, such as Britain and Norway.