ABSTRACT
Chapter 1 sets out the framework of the problem as this is found in Berlin. I begin by tracing the idea of value pluralism in his work before analyzing it into its component parts, opening up issues of interpretation that will recur in later chapters. This leads to a critical discussion focusing on the following issues: (1) is pluralism true? (2) Is it a form of relativism? (3) How can we choose among plural values when they conflict? (4) What are pluralism’s political implications? Question (3) is, of course, the central ‘problem of value pluralism’. Berlin offers various suggestions in response to it, including psychological affinity, universalism, compromise, non-rational agonism, contextualism (in various dimensions), and a conceptual approach that derives practical principles from the idea of pluralism itself. He does not pursue any of these suggestions in detail, but they offer clues that have been taken up by later writers.
