ABSTRACT
Some writers say that there is simply no reasoned choice among fundamental values when they conflict; in such cases, we must simply choose in a non-grounded way. To use Berlin’s term, we must simply ‘plump’ for one option or the other. In Chapter 3, I begin by looking at views along these lines, including those of Weber, Schmitt, and Mouffe – the ‘agonistic’ school of pluralism. The basic problem with this outlook, I argue, is that it fails to account for the fact that we do in reality manage to rank conflicting incommensurables, for decisive reason, in context. Consequently, Chapter 3 continues with an examination of the view, found in many pluralists, that a reasoned ranking of incommensurable values is possible if it is contextual. At the level of individual decision making, the model is that of Aristotle’s situated ethics, which is employed in a pluralist setting by Nussbaum. Further, such an approach is often reinforced by an appeal to cultural tradition, suggesting both a wider social or public policy application and also a conservative political bent, a tendency defended explicitly by John Kekes. I argue that while there is good reason for pluralists to accept contextualism in general, there are serious problems with the narrowly traditionalist reading of context.
