ABSTRACT
In Chapter 5, the discussion takes a crucial turn, shifting from a contextual to a conceptual approach. The basic idea is that when incommensurable values conflict we can look for guidance by reflecting on aspects of the concept of value pluralism itself. My starting point is again the work of Bernard Williams, who sketches the idea of an intimate relationship between value pluralism and the promotion of a ‘diversity’ of values and suggests that this diversity is best promoted by liberal institutions. Once again, his case is not complete, but it can be supplemented and made more persuasive. I go on to consider a series of objections to the diversity argument. For example, the passage from pluralism to diversity faces the complaint that this violates ‘Hume’s law’, which forbids attempts to derive values from facts. I reply that the starting point of the argument is actually a normative position, since most pluralists identify and are committed to the great goods they say are plural. Another objection points out that liberalism inevitably places limits on the range of goods and ways of life possible in a society. Here I respond that no form of politics will be unlimited in its promotion of diversity; liberalism is simply less limited, from a pluralist perspective, than the alternatives.
