ABSTRACT
Chapter 6 serves two purposes. First, I consider a second conceptual link between pluralism and liberalism, through personal autonomy. Second, this adds further detail to my account of what liberal pluralism will look like. Both purposes are pursued through an engagement with the work of William Galston, who cites Berlinian pluralism as part of the framework for his picture of liberalism. For Galston, the incommensurability of fundamental human goods must be acknowledged, but when this is taken together with an emphasis on the value of ‘expressive liberty’ the result is a ‘Reformation’ liberalism that is based on toleration, including toleration of non-liberal groups. I examine Galston’s position, questioning whether it is really preferable, from a pluralist point of view, to the ‘Enlightenment’ liberalism, based on personal autonomy, that he rejects. I argue in favor of the Enlightenment version of liberalism, both from within the logic of Galston’s own position and through an independent link between pluralism and autonomy.
