ABSTRACT
The Anglo-American talks in the Bahamas were conducted with such haste that many crucial issues connected with the formation and operation of a British Polaris force, and its implications for the UK's deterrent posture as a whole, had simply not had time to be properly considered. By the middle of January 1963, Zuckerman's initial mission to the United States had returned to the UK having made good progress with fulfilling its fact-finding remit. As well as reporting American advice that a 16-missile submarine was much to be preferred over any other configuration, Zuckerman's report also came down firmly in favour of acquiring the A3 version of the Polaris missile system. In Washington, however, the multinational parts of the Nassau Agreement were not regarded as of the same level of significance as its multilateral aspects. By March 1963, the British team negotiating the terms of a Polaris Sales Agreement had completed their work, and were evidently very pleased with the outcome.
