ABSTRACT
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate whether the Finnish parliament is still as subservient to pressure group influence in the 1990s when it comes to labour market policy making as was commonly regarded to be the case after the conclusion of broad based settlements from 1968 onwards. The main focus will be on the parliamentary standing Committee for Labour Affairs, since it deals with all matters related to the labour market. The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first, the formal decision making procedures of the parliament are explained, as well as the formal and informal procedures of the Committee for Labour Affairs. The second part is an evaluation of the parliamentary deliberation of the working hours case. These two parts lead to the third and final part, which is a discussion on whether there has been, or still is, a democratic deficit in Finland when it comes to labour market policy making. The common view among MPs has been that corporate pluralist arrangements reduce the role of the parliament and therefore also lead to a democratic deficit. A contrasting view is that the involvement of organised interests in public policy making does not pose a threat against democratic institutions, but is to be seen as an alternative form of democracy. I
The main theoretical problem in the corporatist literature was how to describe the relationship between organised interests and the state. As noted in chapter one, alternative approaches were made, including different sub categorisations of corporatism as a concept. The theoretical relationship between states and organised interests remained underdeveloped in the corporatist literature, however, but empirical findings nonetheless pointed
to a highly regulated relationship between them in certain areas. The main economic interest groups had gained access to different boards, commissions and committees, and had been asked opinions in matters of their concerns. In an axiomatic statement from 1966, Rokkan noted that votes count but resources decide. l The electoral channel was seen as subservient to the corporate channel.
