ABSTRACT
This chapter explores significant problems in the light of the challenges arising from the proposed international regulation of competition through antitrust rules. It examines to replace anti-dumping legislation by antitrust rules and their likely effects on international commerce. The chapter explores the rationality behind these rules, as well as their intellectual origins. It promotes antitrust rules to regulate international transactions would regulate rivalry among firms, introducing a disincentive to competition. The chapter argues that these rules do not strengthen the international institutional framework but instead undermine it, sources of discretion and uncontrolled behaviour that could seriously diminish the expectations of the participants in the international economic order. Markets can only function within a defined framework of rights, and this is a responsibility of governments, not particular. Based on the "prisoner's dilemma" situation developed under the models of game theory, it is possible to predict that governments will be inclined to favour their "own" national firms against their foreign counterparts.
