ABSTRACT
This chapter explains the skeptical version of antifoundationalism and shows how it constitutes a strong thread that ties together various forms of critical jurisprudence. It argues that the skeptical form of antifoundationalism is flawed because it involves a paradox about theory and practice, a paradox that implicates the metaphor of being inside/outside a practice or conceptual scheme. The chapter presents the second version of antifoundationalism, purged of its skeptical basis and the accompanying paradox. It describes the liberal account of rights in the light of the revised antifoundational critique and, more generally, relate liberalism to individualism. The persuasiveness of liberalism over communitarianism depends on acceptance of quite general principles, principles giving priority to rights of autonomy in the lace of the claims of tradition and of a richer notion of the common good. Questions can be raised about the partiality that critical theory associates with an individualist account of autonomy and rights.
