ABSTRACT
The incompatibilist draws from a deterministic account governing the fact that an agent has performed a certain action a modal conclusion that grounds his belief that the agent of such an action is justly absolved from moral responsibility. J. Fischer, a sympathetic critic, concedes, after reviewing unsuccessful attempts at rebuttal, that Frankfurt may have demonstrated that moral responsibility can be present even when the agent lacks freedom or power over outcomes. Yet sophisticated incompatibilists would balk a bit at the formulation, adopted by Fischer, which requires them to believe that determination implies compulsion. The incompatibilist Campbell denied, against Schlick, that he was guilty of confusing causation with compulsion. Yet when Campbell described the feature of causal sequences he found disturbing, it turned out after all to be the absence of control. If Frankfurt is right, however, this feature can be present in a case of action satisfying Campbell's requirements for freedom.
