ABSTRACT
The incompatibilist holds that the truth of universal determinism is a submerged truth-condition of 'he could not have done otherwise', and the compatibilist holds that it is not a truth-condition of that remark, in its ordinary sense, at all. This chapter argues that Kenny has not shown that the incompatibilist's argument fails. On the contrary, the argument seems incontestably valid. The compatibilist holds that the meaning of 'I could have done otherwise' is such that that proposition can be true even if it was not naturally possible that I should have done otherwise. To claim 'I could have done otherwise' is to claim a number of things, but it is not to claim that natural determinism is false. Professor Anscombe in her inaugural lecture says that compatibilism is 'gobbledygook'; and Davidson has a short-tempered moment in the first paragraph of his paper 'Freedom to act', writing, 'I know of none that is more than superficially plausible'.
