ABSTRACT
Freewill is a problem as much in the philosophy of mind as in other parts of philosophy. The philosophy of mind, of course, covers a set of complicated and interrelated topics at least as large as that of freewill itself, and currently even more intensively debated. This chapter aims to make some basically phenomenological points about the correct philosophical account of certain concepts which are indispensable for the problem of freewill. The notions of choice and of action, together with related or synonymous terms, form the most obvious link between freewill and philosophy of mind. The commonest forms of dualism and empiricism use the notion of a volition or an act of will. Human activity is teleological; that is, men do things in order to achieve their aims or purposes. Of the cluster of concepts and locutions relating to teleology, the three most important for the chapter's purposes are 'intention', 'motive' and 'reason'.
