ABSTRACT
Self-unification differs from the other two dimensions in that it is not reflexive. That is, the domain in which the agent takes on commitments is not the same as the domain in which she is required to uphold those commitments. The fact that the commitments of personal identity can pull against the commitments of practical agency illuminates just one of the many ways in which autonomy is augmented when all of the agent's commitments cohere. More demandingly, an agent may be committed to not experiencing certain affective responses at all. For instance, an agent who disvalues jealousy may be committed to not experiencing jealousy, under any circumstances. Action can also occur in the absence of practical deliberation in situations in which agents are forced to perform actions under severe time-pressure. In thinking about the possibility of autonomous radical transformation, it will be useful to draw out a key difference between the four-dimensional theory and David Velleman's work on self-determination.
