ABSTRACT
This chapter looks at developments in legal moralism. In a work seeking to defend any version of the harm principle that is strict in the sense of ruling out other justifications for interference, one would be remiss not to discuss legal moralism. The basic idea behind legal moralism is that law can be used to prevent certain sorts of non-harmful immoralities. In the middle position—the societal harm moralism—its proponent would need to defend the claim that society is the sort of thing that can be harmed at all. The chapter examines a different way of thinking about legal moralism, presented recently by Stephen Wall. Wall's concern is with critical morality; he takes legal moralism to be a presumption that law can be used to "further" "good character" and "living well". The chapter briefly discusses legal paternalism. A more standard—and perhaps less cold-hearted sounding—response to legal paternalism is to reiterate the value of individual choice or autonomy.
