ABSTRACT
This chapter substantiates the claim that intuitional and perceptual experiences have aspect of their phenomenal characters in common. There is, in analytic philosophy, somewhat of an aversion to examining the phenomenal character of conscious experiences in detail, and an even greater aversion to placing theoretical weight on what such examinations might reveal. Moreover, ostensive uses of phenomenal contrast are significantly more likely to succeed in aiding recognition of attitude-specific phenomenology than in doing so for content-specific phenomenology. The phenomenal character of an experience is what it feels like to have it. Consider the visual perceptual experience the people are currently undergoing. Phenomenology of objectivity is also present in other perceptual modalities. Perceptual experience purports to represent a world that is independent of the perceiving subject. The phenomenology of pushiness and objectivity can help single out perceptual and intuitional experiences from other mental states, and, in particular, from belief and conscious thought.
