ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the author describes, in the diagnostic part, both standard theories of personal identity — the bundle and ego theory — as forms of the self-same philosophical atomism. Thereafter, he tries to demonstrate the untenability of one important constituent of this still highly influential approach in analytical anthropology, namely the perceptual model of self-knowledge. Subsequently, the author exposes, in the therapeutic part, in what way Peter Strawson's descriptive metaphysics of the person contains the essential preliminaries for an alternative solution to the problem of personal identity. Strawson's non-atomistic view conceptually describes the place of persons as moral agents in our commonsensical scheme of reality. Such a descriptive metaphysics stays in line with our 'instinctive' and generally accepted beliefs and values. Finally, he briefly outlines how such a Strawsonian non-atomistic view can be developed further into an alternative view of personal identity to which he have given the name analytical personalism.
