ABSTRACT
In March 1789, Smith told his publisher Thomas Cadell that he had written “a compleat new sixth part containing a practical system of morality” for TMS, “under the title of the Character of Virtue”. Part VI of TMS is divided into three sections: a short one on prudence, a longer one on benevolence, and a longer one yet on self-command. Like Aristotle and unlike Hume, Smith presents the virtues largely from the perspective of how the people might achieve them, rather than how they might recognize them in others. It would be a mistake, however, to think that the first five Parts of TMS are devoid of normative elements—to regard them as a fore-runner of modern positivist social science, abjuring normativity in favour of a neutral description of our moral practices. Korsgaard’s textual basis for attributing the reflective endorsement view to Hume is rather shaky.
