ABSTRACT
This chapter examines critically the core factors of Carter's initial reluctance to understand the Soviet motives for intervention in Afghanistan. In 1979, the Soviets completely isolated the United States (US) from the region and its position became vulnerable but this situation did not affect the Carter administration. Initially, within the Carter administration, Vance won the skimishes over Afghanistan policy and the administration did not pursue an over-assertive policy. The rationale behind the US sanctions was to provide the Soviets with incentives for leaving Afghanistan. According to Vance, getting Soviet forces out of Afghanistan was the administration's 'fundamental objective'. The Reagan doctrine asserted that the US had a right to intervene against Marxist-Leninist governments because they had been brought to power by illegitimate methods. The Reagan administration added decisively to the difficulties of the USSR in Afghanistan with its arms supplies to the mujahideen and Afghanistan became one of the most successful covert operations centres since the Second World War.
