ABSTRACT
There are at least two interesting kinds of volitionism. H.A. Prichard's statement that all one ever does in acting is perform an inner act of willing is defmitive of 'classical volitionism.' 1 A certain introspective, phenomenological, Cartesian style of argument typifies the attempts to establish classical volitionism. Scathing attacks by Wittgenstein and Ryle apparently put an end to this way of arguing for volitionism; however, volitionism is back with a vengeance in the guise of what I have been calling 'new-wave volitionism'. The new strategy is to argue for the theoretical need for an inner volitional element in all physical action by focusing on the ordinary concept of trying, instead of a philosophically theory-laden concept like willing. These arguments from 'trying' supposedly show in various ways that, where q> is a basic bodily movement, r trying to q>" and r q>-ing" do not always refer to the same event. r Trying to q>" can designate an act of the agent even when no overt bodily movement q> occurs. r Trying to q>", it seems, must refer to an event which, at least in part, consists of a special inner volitional element. Hornsby and 0' Shaughnessy argue in different ways for their new-wave volitional conclusions, but both agree that the description of an action in terms of trying is the most basic description, in that it reveals that action must involve an event akin to what classical theories recognized as an act of the will. 2 As 0' Shaughnessy puts it: 'The de re essential description of trying to raise an arm is: "trying to raise an arm'" (Will, 2, p. 350). If such claims about the 'basicness' of trying can be substantiated, then the new-wave volitional theories are
well on their way to being established. What distinguishes Hornsby's approach is her belief that a Davidsonian framework for understanding human action implies the truth of a kind of volitionism - a kind explicated in tenns of trying. In this chapter, 1 will challenge the idea that volitionism can be supported by Davidsonian principles alone - a Davidsonian framework does not lead to volitionism. If one accepts Davidsonian principles concerning action individuation, does one description of a physical action, 'trying' - as opposed to all possible others - reveal the nature of action in any privileged manner? And is there any ontologically significant sense that can be given to a 'basic act description'? On the way to arguing for a negative answer to both these questions 1 will challenge Hornsby's basic arguments for her new-wave volitionism: (A) that from sentences such as 'I moved my ann by contracting my muscles' and 'I contracted my muscles by making a brain event occur' it is possible to derive descriptions of action in terms more basic than those of bodily movement, and (B) that when one moves one's ann, the act of moving causes one's ann to move.
