There were two basic solutions to the problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents prevalent in western theology. The first could trace its roots back to Augustine and Boethius, and its most important advocate was the Dominican Thomas Aquinas. The second theory was a newer development, initiated by the secular Henry of Ghent and more clearly articulated in Peter Auriol’s own lifetime by the Franciscan John Duns Scotus. This chapter presents Auriol’s position following the basic conceptual order: Since God is immutable, and immutability is the same as necessity, He cannot know the future as future in any way, otherwise everything would happen of necessity; God knows the future not as future but as present, or rather indistant to Him in His eternity; future contingent propositions are not true or false, and God’s knowledge of the future does not make them true or false; and there must be a distinction between God’s active, extrinsic will, and His passive, intrinsic will.