ABSTRACT
Historians have posited that by the end of the war the issue of Ireland had been conceded to all intents and purposes.1 Yet, in 1906 the Irish Union had been described by Walter Long with mild understatement as ‘the greatest cause ever committed to the care of mortal man’.2 The purpose of this chapter is to understand exactly how the war affected Unionism, and what impact this had on the party. Did the experience of war intimately and irrevocably alter the nature of Unionism and, in turn, transform the party’s identity? Was the party liable to break over Ireland as has been suggested,3 and if so what preserved party unity? A party that in summer 1916 wrecked a proposed settlement, by 1918 appeared to accept that an Irish settlement was inevitable. Historians have explained this apparent conversion in a number of ways: as a result of the Conservative Party having to seek out a solution as a governing party;4 as the outcome of a strong backlash against Unionist obstruction in mid-1916 and the subsequent impulse to solve the question as a non-party issue;5 as a consequence of the 1917 Irish Convention breaking down southern Irish resistance to a settlement;6 as a product of the prioritization of the British war effort and the need for Irish troops in the national service debate of 1918.7 Yet it remains unclear just how far the party had travelled by 1918. Equally, as Unionism tossed and turned during the war, it remains problematic to understand exactly how the party managed to avoid becoming ensnared in the bed linen and awake with anything approaching a clear head. An examination of interpretations of the Union reveals that the party started a slow and painful conversion in 1914, while common themes served to unite Conservatives through these torrid events.
