In the last two chapters Murdoch’s opposition to the philosophies of her contemporaries was outlined; in particular, to their pictures of the self and to their uncritical adoption of the fact/value dichotomy. In contrast to these positions Murdoch presents her own picture of the self, in which the inner life and inner moral activity are fundamental, and through which the reality of moral values is known. In this endeavour Murdoch turns to experience to justify her case, as both the starting-point and means of verification for her philosophy. From experience she asserts the primacy of a moral background for all aspects of human knowing and evaluation. In the light of this allencompassing moral background Murdoch claims that moral values are real and that it is by moral evaluation that we comprehend all aspects of the world. Moral knowledge is not only possible, but prior to all forms of knowledge. The key moral concept, as touched upon in the last chapter, is the good, from which all other moral knowledge is derived. In this chapter we will consider the nature and status of Murdoch’s good and assess her arguments for this, her primary moral concept, around which her philosophy is built.