ABSTRACT
Spinoza’s metaphysical philosophy Hegel’s most coherent understanding of Spinozism is developed in book two of the Science of Logic: The Doctrine of Essence, in which he characterizes both the limitations of Spinoza’s philosophy and the necessary steps required to overcome these limitations. Much of the distinction that Hegel makes between his own approach to philosophy, in contrast to Spinoza’s, is presented as the distinction between metaphysical philosophy and the dialectical development of philosophy. For Hegel, metaphysical philosophy seeks to assert and produce only what comes under the category of being, or substance. He argues that ‘the philosophy which adopts the standpoint of Substance and stops there is the system of Spinoza’.1 The critical method that Hegel brings to Spinoza’s philosophy is his dialectical logic, one step in the development of which is constituted by his refutation of Spinoza’s philosophy. He outlines his method as follows: ‘The only possible refutation of Spinozism must … consist … in recognizing its standpoint as essential and necessary and then going on to raise that standpoint to the higher one through its own immanent dialectic. The relationship of substance considered simply and solely in its own intrinsic nature leads on to its opposite, to the Concept. The exposition of substance which leads on to the Concept is, therefore, the sole and genuine refutation of Spinozism’.2 The question can be raised as to what exactly Hegel considers Spinozist substance to be such that it can be subsumed in the concept according to the dialectical logic? What is required in order to respond to this question is an understanding both of the difference between their respective conceptions of substance, and an understanding of how these different conceptions figure in the development of their respective philosophies. After presenting this difference, the manner by means of which Spinoza is figured by Hegel in the development of his dialectical logic will be addressed, with close attention being paid to those aspects of Hegel’s interpretation of the limits of Spinoza’s philosophy which enable this development. My argument will be that Hegel’s interpretation of
correspondence of Spinoza. It is this reading which specifically allows Hegel to figure Spinoza within the dialectical logic. By offering a reading of the passage from this letter within the context of Spinoza’s Ethics, a different conception of Spinoza’s substance is presented. One which allows an interpretation of Spinoza that overcomes those limitations presented by Hegel which are necessary to figure the Spinozist system within the dialectical logic. The Ethics commences with the idea of an absolutely unconditioned cause, or causa sui,3 which Spinoza characterizes as one substance, developed in the set of definitions and principles at the beginning of the Ethics. There is one and only one substance, which varies in an infinite number of ways. Spinoza’s concept of substance is interchangeable with his concept of both Nature and God. This substance has an absolutely infinite power of existing, that is, of producing all things that exist – including itself, causa sui – and an absolutely infinite power of thinking, hence of self-comprehension, which entails the power of comprehending all that is produced. This unique, universal and infinite substance can be understood to be an expression of being, which Spinoza organizes into substance, attributes and modes. Substance expresses itself in an infinity of attributes, each of which is expressed infinitely. Attributes are infinite forms of being which are really distinct, that is, they are irreducible to one another. Although the different attributes express the same thing insofar as they each refer to the same single substance. The essence of substance has no existence outside the attributes, therefore each attribute expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence,4 and the essence of each of the attributes together form the essence of an absolutely single substance. In this way the attributes constitute the essence of substance. Substance is the cause of all things in the same sense that it is cause of itself; that is, it produces things through the very forms that constitute its own essence. It does this by producing things through the attributes. Things in general can therefore be understood to be modifications of substance through the attributes. As Spinoza says: ‘Particular things are nothing but affections of God’s attributes, or
3 Spinoza, Ethics, I, D3. The following conventional abbreviated notation will be used
when referring to Spinoza’s Ethics: EI (II…V) for Ethics, Part I (roman numerals refer to the Parts of the Ethics); A for axiom; C for corollary; D for demonstration (or definition if followed by an Arabic numeral); L for lemma; Post. for postulate; P for proposition; S for scholium (Arabic numerals denote the lemma, proposition or scholium number); and, Ap for appendix. Thus EIP8S2 or Ethics, I, P8S2 refer to Ethics, Part I, Proposition 8, Scholium 2. Unless otherwise indicated, citations from the Ethics and from Spinoza’s correspondence are quoted from The Collected Works of Spinoza Volume I, ed. and trans. E. Curley (Princeton, 1985).
