ABSTRACT
The concept of legitimacy implies that we carefully weigh up which reasons justify obedience to an obligation. This conception of legitimacy goes beyond Max Weber’s understanding of the subject in which legitimate rule was reflected in people’s belief in the three different types of rational-legal, traditional, or charismatic legitimacy (Weber 1968, 33-8). The Weberian understanding of the subject has been widely criticized because it separates the belief in legitimacy from the evaluation of political rule against external moral reasons (Beetham 1991, 815; Habermas 1992, 541-63; Sternberger 1967). A conception of legitimacy which ignores the weight of morality takes the risk to justify authoritarian political power as legitimate then if the people are convinced of the adequacy of immoral power. If enlightenment and democracy are seen as indispensable achievements of modern civilization, the concept of legitimacy has to consider that external moral reasons also, though not exclusively, justify obedience of the people to political power.
