ABSTRACT
Over the last several decades, the United States and its allies-particularly its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)- have acted in concert a number of times to prevent or bring to an end certain kinds of conflicts. These conflicts have begun with attacks and counterattacks among ethnic groups, with ethnic cleansing, with mass violations of human rights, or with the collapse into chaos of countries with inept or criminal leadership. What all had in common is that they brought misery and death to a large number of ordinary, noncombatant citizens and threatened to spread the turmoil to neighbouring countries - and triggered strains and schisms among the coalitions that responded to them. These remain a threat to future efforts at conflict resolution or prevention. The responses to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks only masked those strains momentarily, coming in the wake of the immediate sympathy for the victims and the rather impulsive solidarity with the United States that followed. When, a little more than a year after the Al Qaeda strike, the possibility of a preventive war in the Persian Gulf arose, the conceptual and moral schism between the U.S. and many of its traditional allies in what concerns the conduct of a preventive war was ever more evident (Applebaum 2003).
