ABSTRACT
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of Rudolf Carnap's and Otto Neurath's arguments. It brings out significant differences in their agendas. The chapter describes the way in which divergences between Carnap's and Neurath's views were reflected in contrasts in the way they marshalled their opposition to the notion of a private language. It shows how traditional empiricism could survive the strictures of consistent scientism and the verification principle. The chapter then begins by describing the historical setting, in Vienna, in which the possibility of private language became a central issue. When the Vienna Circle became a recognized group in 1929 the background against which philosophical concerns about privacy would subsequently arise had already been set out in two major works. One was Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; the other was Carnap's The Logical Structure of the World. The Logical Structure of the World was Carnap's first concerted attempt to establish the unity of science and defend its objectivity.
