ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses two insights into the private language argument and both attach significance made in Philosophical Investigations. One insight has already been considered, since it was itself an essential component in Anthony Kenny's interpretation: the idea that ostensive definition is not the ultimate bridge between language and reality. Kenny's point had been that if private ostension is the only means of constructing a private language. The second insight took the notion of rule-following to be the central issue in Philosophical Investigations and the discussion of the possibility of a private language to be secondary. The 'Kripkean Private Language Argument' was a part of the rule-following considerations, and not even a corollary of them; and Wittgenstein's positive views about language were part of the private language argument. The distinctive feature of the Kripkean Private Language Argument is the structure it assigns to Philosophical Investigations. John McDowell developed his views largely in response to the arguments of Saul Kripke and W.
