ABSTRACT
This chapter considers whether social contract theories can provide a good framework for characterising duties to non-nationals. The best known example of deriving duty from self-interest is that of Hobbes' social contract theory, which produces a theory of justice which has been characterised as 'justice as mutual advantage' or justice as a modus vivendi. Rawls' theory of 'justice as fairness' has a rather different conception of the conditions under which people should select principles of justice. In Rawls' theory, the gap between the two was clearly evident: motivation was kept separate from moral duty through the procedural division between the rationality of the parties and the veil of ignorance. There are three traditional accounts of the sources of moral motivation: it could be held to be located in self-interest, sentiment, or a more moral conception of rationality. Barry argues that people are motivated to agree to his criteria for just rules precisely because of their desire for reasonable agreement.
