ABSTRACT
Two nations defeated by the Allied Powers, both with currencies ruined by government expenditure excesses due to the war effort, and with central bank portfolios loaded with relatively worthless government paper, lend themselves to a comparison of post-1945 central banking reform. It is true that the sovereignty of the German Reich had com pletely vanished with Germany’s unconditional surrender and the country was partitioned among the Allies, while the Japanese state remained intact and the country remained united under American occupation. But as the Americans, due to their financial strength, also played the leading role among the three occupying powers of West Germany, it is especially useful to compare the aims and results of American banking policies in Japan and Germany under partly equal and partly different conditions. Especially in the financial and economic field, there were cases in which even the persons responsible for planning and executing policies in Germany and Japan were identical. Joseph M. Dodge first served as financial adviser to the American military government in Germany and was later sent with a similar function to Japan. The same is true for William H. Draper, who was General Clay’s economic ad viser in Germany and later also served in Japan.
