ABSTRACT
Bush's address to the UN General Assembly and his subsequent release of the National Security Strategy (NSS) set the stage for concurrent and equally vigorous, domestic and international debates over the need to disarm Iraq, which led to the passage of two measures: a US Congressional Resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq and a UN Security Council Resolution demanding that Saddam readmit and grant unrestricted investigative access to UN inspectors charged with determining the extent to which his regime has disarmed. This chapter examines the Bush administration's NSS and its application in the context of the run-up to and conduct of the Second Iraq War. It provides an assessment of the historical basis and contemporary rationale for a doctrine of pre-emption and a review of the central tenets of the NSS. The chapter presents an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the NSS and a discussion of the application of the NSS to the case of Iraq.
