ABSTRACT
T H E doctrine of the international wrong, that is to say, the violation of a duty imposed by public international law, is both one of the most important and one of the most intricate chapters of public international law. It is, on the one hand, so important because it is that part of public internationallaw with which the practising lawyer most frequently comes (or ought to co me ) into contact, for wrongs suffered by a physical or legal person at the hands of a foreign State are unfortunately a matter of daily occurrence, although they are not always diagnosed as such, and even if they are, the absence of diplomatic protection or the lack of submission by the wrongdoing State to a tribunal is likcly to render a remedy illusory. On the other hand, the intricacy arises from the existence of a relatively large amount of material on State responsibility, from which, however, in many respects a firm rule has not yet been evolved. Thus even such elementary questions as the scope of abus de droit as a cause of action2 or the imputability of acts occurring within its jurisdiction to the State3 are to some extent controversial and in need of that clarification which only a developed body of judicial decisions can provide.
