ABSTRACT
The supposedly problematic feature of the etiological theory as conceptual analysis is that (true to its name) it makes a trait's function depend on its history, more specifically (and supposedly worse) on its evolutionary history. There are three standard objections to this which I will mention now and discuss later. (i) It seems blatantly inaccurate histori-
cally. When Harvey announced the function of the heart in 1616 he knew nothing of Darwin's theory, and so he clearly didn't mean, or have in mind, that the circulation of blood was the effect for which hearts were selected by natural selection (Wright 1976, 97; Boorse 1976, 74; Nagel 1977, 284). (ii) Defining the notion of a "proper function" in terms of natural selection begs empirical and theological questions, and is "analytically arrogant" because it would seem ". . . to suggest that it is impossible by the very nature of the concepts-logically impossible-that organismic structures and processes get their functions by the conscious intervention (design) of a Divine Creator" (Wright 1976, 96-97. See also Boorse 1976, 74; and Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, 188.) (iii) It is strongly counterintuitive that a creature which lacked a history would thereby lack functions. Suppose we discovered that the whole lion species freakishly coalesced into existence one day, without evolution or design of any kind, "by an unparalleled saltation" (Boorse 1976, 74). Or consider" ... the possible world identical to this one in all matters of laws and particular matters of fact, except that it came into existence by chance (or without cause) five minutes ago" (Bigelow and Pargetter 1987, 188). Surely, we can correctly ascribe biological functions to any such complex, intricately integrated organisms, despite their lack of history and their accidental genesis. Or so the argument goes.
