ABSTRACT
This chapter provides support for McDowell's rejection of the dualism of scheme and content and for his retention of minimal empiricism. A thorough understanding of the implications of the dualism is, however, important as it is intricately intertwined with issues that McDowell draws on in Mind and World. McDowell claims to be a minimal empiricist, and such a position is generally considered to be in line with a philosophical stance that upholds the dualism. McDowell's espousal of minimal empiricism leads him to accuse Donald Davidson of rejecting what appears to be a necessary condition for empirical content, that is, the role of experience in grounding judgements and beliefs. McDowell links Davidson's attack on the dualism of scheme and content to Quine's attack on the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Davidson draws attention to the fact that even seemingly innocent mention of 'our conceptual scheme' contains an assumption that there might be 'rival systems'.
