ABSTRACT
In the Treatise, Hume claims that the principle of sympathy is the foundation of morals. But in the second Enquiry Hume holds that the principle of humanity is the foundation of morals. With regard to the relationship between sympathy and humanity there are two views. One, sympathy and humanity are two different principles and Hume abandons sympathy in the second Enquiry. L. A. Selby-Bigge and D. G. C. MacNabb, among others, hold this position. Two, Hume does not abandon sympathy in his later work and humanity is basically the same as sympathy, for it includes ‘no newly found feelings or passions’. John B. Stewart takes this position. In this chapter I present a new interpretation of the relationship between sympathy and humanity based on critical examinations of the above views. My position is this: humanity is corrected and thus consistent sympathy, or, in Hume’s own language, stabilized sympathy. This allows an alternative view, three, Hume does not abandon sympathy in the second Enquiry and humanity is not the same as (bare) sympathy. A more precise formulation of my position includes three theses: (a) Humanity is corrected and thus consistent sympathy; (b) Reason, understood broadly, plays the corrective role; (c) The lack of consistency of sympathy over space and time is corrected from the general point of view.
