ABSTRACT
In the last chapter I argued that the most general principle of morality, for Hume, is that of humanity, which is explained in terms of corrected and thus consistent sympathy. There are three points with regard to the concept of humanity that Hume notices but for which he does not offer adequate explanation. Yet these points are essential for his theory. (a) The idea that humanity is the unity of the virtues is implicit in the Treatise (579) and the second Enquiry (214). Hume says, ‘Courage . . . when not regulated by benevolence, [is] fit only to make a tyrant and public robber’ (T 604). Hume, however, does not make the unity thesis explicit. (b) It is true that (almost) all human beings have fellow feelings (sympathy) for each other, as Hume stresses, but having the feeling of sympathy is not yet having the virtue of humanity. In order to attain humanity self-cultivation is absolutely necessary. Hume is very explicit about the need for self-cultivation. He makes this clear in the Treatise, the second Enquiry (cf. T 481, T 488-489) and especially in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. However, he does not explicitly offer any adequate or specific theory of self-cultivation.
