ABSTRACT
To find our way to the views of the third key person of American (post)analytic philosophy discussed here, Wilfrid Sellars, let us again return to the meaning of such pronouncements as "'rabbit' (in English) means (refers to) rabbit(s)" or "'justice' (in English) means justice", which we have considered several times during the previous two chapters. It is clearly pronouncements of this kind which force on us the picture of semantics as a matter of links between words and things, according to which the semantics of English appears to be a matter of a specific relation between the word "rabbit" and rabbits (or rabbithood), the word 'justice" and justice (or just deeds) etc. If we want to reject the nomenclaturistic picture of language and thus deny that such pronouncements simply report links between words and things, we must explain what it is that they say - for it seems obvious that they do make some good sense.
