ABSTRACT
In this book we will pursue the idea that the concepts of meaning and structure are intimately interrelated, indeed that meaning is, in a clearly explicable sense, a matter of structure. Despite the fact that this thesis has been entertained in various forms by a number of different linguists and philosophers, it continues to sound controversial - perhaps even absurd - and I am afraid its promotion could be decried as an exhibition by one of those academic Geisteswissenschaftler who depend on creating pseudoproblems for their existence. To pre-empt such a verdict I will attempt to show, in this chapter, that meaning is more problematic than it may, prima facie, appear. In particular, I will indicate that the usual straightforward theories of how language works and what is meaning, which might appear so natural and so explicative to an uncritical eye, become dubious when subjected to critical scrutiny. Those readers who are clear about the untenability of such simplistic theories are begged for patience: they will find this chapter largely dispensable.
