ABSTRACT
In Japan, too, the events of I I September forced a complete reassessment of foreign policy obj ectives and interests, and demanded a change in the legal basis for Japanese involvement in peacekeeping operations.2 Since the end of the Second World War, domestic politics had been largely structured around ongoing debates about Japan's international responsibilities and how far it should become involved in international society. Any desire to broaden the role of the non-belligerent Self Defence Force (SDF) was contested and resisted, and although the last decade of the twentieth century saw Japan materialise into a more active player in international peacekeeping operations, the dramatic events of 200 I forced Japan into expanding the terms and conditions under which it might participate in peacekeeping activities that were sponsored by the United Nations (UN). On 7 December 200 I, the BBC reported that the Japanese parliament, the Diet, had finally approved a law that would allow Japanese troops involved in peacekeeping operations to take up arms not only in self-defence, but also to protect soldiers from other nations and civilians such as refugees. 3
However, attempts at a multilateral response in Asia to the terrorist threat are muted, as individual governments in the region prefer a unilateral agenda. In the first half of 2004, Indonesia suggested ASEAN should create its own peacekeeping force that would work closely with the United Nations. This would have two advantages. First, it would offer an alternative to American, British and Australian-dominated forces (Asians protecting Asians). Second, the force could react immediately to emergencies in the region that might require intervention. Indonesia also suggested that the ASEAN force could play a role in peacekeeping outside Asia if both the UN and the host governments assented to its participation. Nevertheless, the ASEAN foreign ministers rejected Indonesia's proposal in June 2004, allegedly because ASEAN is not a defence organisation, and it is still too early to expect its members to collaborate on creating such multilateral security frameworks. More cynical observers suspect the real explanation is that Asian governments remain uneasy with the idea of assigning a portion of their sovereignty to other ASEAN members.
