ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that the basic notion of semantic presupposition is sound. It focuses on one special kind of semantic presupposition, namely, the so-called existential presupposition. However, the notion of semantic presupposition has been under constant attack. The attacks come primarily from two directions. On one front, some critics attack the notion indirectly by undermining the central notion of any theory of semantic presuppositions: the notion of truth-valuelessness. On the other front, other critics attack the notion of semantic presupposition head-on, either arguing that the notion itself is not theoretically coherent or contending that the notion, although it is theoretically coherent, is in fact empty since it cannot be exemplified. Another major critical argument raised by S. Boer and W. Lycan against the notion of semantic presupposition claims that it is easy to provide many perfect counterexamples to an enormous number of alleged semantic presuppositions.
