ABSTRACT
Given my criticisms of both philosophical hermeneutics and Wittgenstein’s logical atomism, the reader might assume that I am dismissing altogether a concept of the unity of language. That is not my intent. On the contrary, in this chapter I wish to pursue an elucidation of the unity of language in contrast to Gadamer’s reliance upon a metaphysical concept of ‘being’ and to Wittgenstein’s calculus-like notion of language. We have seen that Gadamer’s concept of ‘being’ plays havoc with his attempt to show ‘language’s constitutive structuring of our being in the world’ (1976b, p. 115). We have also seen that Wittgenstein’s logical atomism undermines his own philosophical position that everyday language is in perfect logical order. In these criticisms of Gadamer and the early Wittgenstein I have relied heavily upon Wittgenstein’s later writings in spite of the recognition that Gadamer shares certain affinities with the later Wittgenstein and that the later Wittgenstein holds many of the same notions held by the early Wittgenstein. Among these shared notions are the centrality of language and the struggle to elucidate its unique epistemological status.
